Migration URL validation bypass via HTTP redirect to blocked internal endpoints Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the repository migration functionality. The application validates only…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-52805 |
| Vendor | go |
| Affected Product | gogs.io/gogs |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 8.7 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
git clone --mirror follows HTTP redirects. An authenticated user can submit a public URL that redirects to a blocked internal endpoint (e.g., 127.0.0.1), importing the internal repository's contents into an attacker-controlled repository.internal/form/repo.go. ParseRemoteAddr() validates the clone address hostname against a blocklist of local and private-network addresses. However, the actual migration is performed by git clone --mirror in `internal/database/reSigma rules, YARA signatures, IOC table, and SIEM queries for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and Chronicle — deployable in 5 minutes.