Summary In the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path, verified here with QEMU (and verified with Cloud Hypervisor too), Kata Containers runs host virtiofsd as root with: `` --sandbox none --seccomp none ` If an attacker…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-47243 |
| Vendor | go |
| Affected Product | github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 7.5 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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virtiofsd as root with: ``--sandbox none --seccomp none ` If an attacker has root-equivalent execution inside the Kata guest VM, they can send raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. With the tested runtime-rs virtio-fs configuration, a raw FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the virtio-fs shared directory. This lets guest root create host-root owned symlinks in sensitive host paths. The PoC created here will create symlinks in the host /etc/cron.d` directory, causing host cron to execute a guest-controlled payload as host root. Impact: guest root can execute code as host
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