Summary Any authenticated user can permanently delete files owned by other users via DELETE /api/v1/files/{id} when the target file is referenced in any shared chat. The has_access_to_file() authorization gate unconditi…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-45671 |
| Vendor | pip |
| Affected Product | open-webui |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 8.0 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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DELETE /api/v1/files/{id} when the target file is referenced in any shared chat. The has_access_to_file() authorization gate unconditionally grants access through its shared-chat branch. It checks neither the requesting user's identity nor the type of operation being performed. File UUIDs (which would otherwise be impractical to guess) are disclosed to any user with read access to a knowledge base via GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files.has_access_to_file() in [backend/open_webui/routers/files.py](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/main/backend/open_webui/routers/files.py). When a user calls DELETE /api/v1/files/{file_id}, the endpoint delegates authoSigma rules, YARA signatures, IOC table, and SIEM queries for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and Chronicle — deployable in 5 minutes.