Summary When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the output, output-all, and debug fields in model.Options are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-45089 |
| Vendor | go |
| Affected Product | github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 8.2 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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output, output-all, and debug fields in model.Options are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the IsLibrary guard in DalLog, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.Sigma rules, YARA signatures, IOC table, and SIEM queries for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and Chronicle — deployable in 5 minutes.