Summary ApostropheCMS's password reset flow constructs the reset URL using req.hostname, which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthe…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-45013 |
| Vendor | npm |
| Affected Product | apostrophe |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 8.1 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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req.hostname, which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application to email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker's domain. When the victim clicks the link, the valid reset token is delivered to the attacker, enabling full account takeover.modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js — resetRequest route Precondition: passwordReset: true is set and apos.baseUrl is not configured.setPrefixUrls middleware (i18n layer) builds req.baseUrl using `req.hoSigma rules, YARA signatures, IOC table, and SIEM queries for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and Chronicle — deployable in 5 minutes.