NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally return 0. In QuicheQuicSer…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-44894 |
| Vendor | maven |
| Affected Product | io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 7.5 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally return 0. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3×
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