Summary The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. Details The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main l…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-44335 |
| Vendor | pip |
| Affected Product | praisonaiagents |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 7.5 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.
The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request. In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get. The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:
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