Summary When directConnect(true) is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally accepts directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath from the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subse…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-43910 |
| Vendor | maven |
| Affected Product | io.appium:java-client |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 8.2 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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directConnect(true) is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionallyaccepts directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath from the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent session traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist, no host validation, and no user notification.
AppiumCommandExecutor.java (line 196–219): setDirectConnect() builds a new URL from server-supplied fields and calls overrideServerUrl(newUrl) without validating host/IP.DirectConnect.java: getUrl() constructs protocol://host:port/path with no allowlist.and port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist.
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