Summary A server-side authentication bypass in azureauthextension allows any party who holds a single valid Azure access token for *any scope the collector's configured identity can mint forto authenticate to any OpenTe…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-42602 |
| Vendor | go |
| Affected Product | github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/extension/azureauthextension |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 8.1 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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azureauthextension allows any party who holds a single valid Azure access token for *any scope the collector's configured identity can mint for* to authenticate to any OpenTelemetry receiver that uses auth: azure_auth. The extension's Authenticate method does not validate incoming bearer tokens as JWTs. Instead, it calls its own configured credential to obtain an access token and compares the client's token to the result with string equality — and the scope for that server-side token request is taken from the client-supplied Host header. As a result, a token minted for any Azure resource the service principal has ever been issued a token for (ARM, Graph, Key Vault, Storage, etc.) will authenticate to the collector if the attacker pSigma rules, YARA signatures, IOC table, and SIEM queries for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and Chronicle — deployable in 5 minutes.