Summary SQL injection in Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3: the channel argument is interpolated straight into LISTEN "..." / UNLISTEN "..." without escaping the " character. Any caller that lets a user influence the chan…
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-32687 |
| Vendor | erlang |
| Affected Product | postgrex |
| Vulnerability Type | Vulnerability |
| CVSS Score | 7.5 (HIGH) |
| Actively Exploited | ❌ No known exploitation |
| Patch Status | See Vendor Advisory → |
| Reported By | CYBERDUDEBIVASH SENTINEL APEX Intelligence (via github_advisories) |
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Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3: the channel argument is interpolated straight into LISTEN "..." / UNLISTEN "..." without escaping the " character. Any caller that lets a user influence the channel name (e.g. a pub/sub bridge that uses a tenant id or topic slug as the channel) and the name is not sanitized can execute arbitrary SQL on the notifications connection. Only those using the Postgrex.Notifications directly or via a dependency, with a non-sanitized channel name are vulnerable. Ecto does not use Postgrex.Notifications by default, but you must validate if any other dependency does." inside a quoted identifier by doubling it to "". Postgrex doesn't do that doubling, so a " inside channel closes the ideSigma rules, YARA signatures, IOC table, and SIEM queries for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and Chronicle — deployable in 5 minutes.